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ABSTRACT 
There is growing evidence that client firms expect outsourcing suppliers to transform their business. 
Indeed, most outsourcing suppliers have delivered IT operational and business process innovation to 
client firms; however, achieving strategic innovation through outsourcing has been perceived to be far 
more challenging. Building on the growing interest in the IS outsourcing literature, this paper seeks to 
advance our understanding of the role that relational and contractual governance plays in achieving 
strategic innovation through outsourcing. We hypothesized and tested empirically the relationship 
between the quality of client-supplier relationships and the likelihood of achieving strategic innovation, 
and the interaction effect of different contract types, such as fixed-price, time and materials, partnership 
and their combinations. Results from a pan-European survey of 248 large firms suggest that high-quality 
relationships between client and suppliers may indeed help achieve strategic innovation through 
outsourcing. However, within the spectrum of various outsourcing contracts, only the partnership 
contract, when included in the client contract portfolio alongside either fixed-price, time and materials or 
their combination, presents a significant positive effect on relational governance and is likely to 
strengthen the positive effect of the quality of client-supplier relationships on strategic innovation.  
Keywords:  Outsourcing, strategic innovation, quality of client-supplier relationship, fixed-price, time 
and materials, joint venture, survey 
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INTRODUCTION 
The last ten years have witnessed significant growth in the outsourcing industry (Oshri et al. 2011). While 
the early years of Information Technology (IT) and business process outsourcing (BPO) were mainly 
characterized by a quest for costs savings (Loh and Venkatraman 1992; Lacity and Hirschheim 1993) and 
a focus on core competences (Quinn and Hilmer 1994), recent evidence suggests that client firms now 
seek to achieve added value from outsourcing by accessing suppliers’ competences (e.g. Dyer and 
Nobeoka 2000; Quinn 2000; Whitley and Willcocks 2011). Mol (2005: 571) argues that “firms are 
increasingly relying on partnering relationships with outside suppliers that can act as an effective 
substitute to the internal generation of knowledge and innovation”. Similarly, Linder et al. (2003) and 
Weeks and Feeny (2008) argue that client firms rely on external suppliers in the search for  new ideas. 
More recently, accepting that innovation is outsourced and offshored, Lewin et al. (2009) studied the 
determinants driving firms to offshore innovations only to conclude that firms have been entering a global 
race for talent in which solutions will be sought wherever skills are available. Such observations suggest 
that innovation may be considered as one of the possible outcomes of outsourcing engagements.  
Indeed, several recent studies have examined the practices through which innovation can be achieved in 
outsourcing settings (Weeks and Feeny, 2008; Whitely and Willcocks 2011; Lacity and Willcocks 2014). 
Weeks and Feeny (2008) offer a taxonomy of forms of innovation through outsourcing that distinguishes 
between IT operational and business process innovations, and strategic innovations. The former 
corresponds with incremental forms of innovation (Dewar and Dutton 1986), while the latter matches the 
definition of radical innovation (Droege et al. 2009). Defined as ways to “significantly enhance the firm’s 
product or service offerings for existing target customers, or enable the firm to enter new markets” 
(Weeks and Feeny 2008: 131), strategic innovations have been traditionally perceived to be more 
challenging to achieve (Weeks and Feeny 2008) and therefore will be the focus of this study. Strategic 
innovation requires significant product or service development and its success can be challenged by lack 
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of cooperation, low levels of trust and information asymmetry between the supplier and client (Weeks and 
Feeny 2008). Similarly, the lack of appropriate incentives for both client and supplier may inhibit the 
sides from developing collaborative innovation through outsourcing (Lacity and Willcocks 2014). The 
limited literature on innovation in the outsourcing context has persistently highlighted the key role that 
relational governance plays in creating favourable conditions for strategic innovation through outsourcing 
(Whitley and Willcocks 2011; Weeks and Feeny 2008). We concur with such observations; however, we 
seek to advance and contribute to the Information Systems (IS) outsourcing literature by examining the 
role that relational and contractual governance plays in fostering strategic innovation through outsourcing. 
In particular, we seek to verify whether high-quality relationships between the client and the suppliers do 
lead to strategic innovation, and whether certain contract types positively or negatively affect the impact 
of high-quality client-supplier relationships on the ability to achieve strategic innovation. Relational 
governance will be examined in this study as the quality of the client and supplier relationships (Lacity et 
al. 2010), while contractual governance will be explored through three contract types commonly used in 
outsourcing engagements: fixed-price, time and materials (Gopal et al. 2003; Gefen et al. 2008) and 
partnership-based (Willcocks and Choi 1995; Dibbern et al. 2004), and the combinations of these contract 
types. This research relies on a pan-European cross-industry survey that included representatives of 248 
firms that are buyers of IT and business process outsourcing services. Respondents were senior managers 
involved in the execution of outsourcing projects or programmes who were selected in accordance to the 
“key informant” methodology (e.g. Goo et al. 2008).  
The contributions of this study are twofold. First, our paper is one of the early attempts to shed light on 
the link between a governance approach and strategic innovation through outsourcing. In this regard, our 
empirical results confirm a positive effect of the client-supplier relationships on the likelihood of 
achieving strategic innovation. Second, this study shows that the interaction of contractual governance 
with relational governance is central to achieving strategic innovation through outsourcing. We found a 
significant positive effect for the partnership contract, when included in the client contract portfolio 
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alongside a fixed-price or time and materials contract, on the positive effect of the quality of client-
supplier relationships on strategic innovation but no effect for fixed-price and time and materials 
contracts, as stand-alone contracts.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: first we review the literature on innovation in the context of 
strategic IT and business process outsourcing; then we theorize about the role of relational and contractual 
governance in achieving strategic innovation. This is followed by an explanation of methods and results 
and a discussion of our findings in the light of the existing literature. The paper concludes with theoretical 
and practical contributions.   
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Strategic Innovation in the Context of IT and Business Process Outsourcing 
The outsourcing of IT and business processes has been recognized as one of the risk factors that may lead 
to the loss of innovative capabilities inside a client’s firm (Weeks and Feeny 2008). Past studies, 
however, have persistently anticipated that outsourcing will deliver new ideas and value to both business 
operations and strategic objectives (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993; Lacity et al. 2010). Despite the above 
risk, innovation is one of the potential promises of outsourcing; however, one which is poorly understood. 
For example, studies that discuss innovation in the context of IS outsourcing have mainly relied on a 
small number of cases or instances, shedding little light about the governance structures affecting 
innovation (e.g. Levina and Vaast 2008; Weeks and Feeny 2008; Whitley and Willcocks 2011; Lacity and 
Willcocks 2013). Further, in the few studies in the IS outsourcing literature that have attempted to model 
innovations, this concept was perceived to be an independent variable (e.g. Kishore et al. 2003) rather 
than a possible outcome of an outsourcing project (Lacity et al. 2010).  
The innovation literature distinguishes between various types of innovations. For example, numerous 
studies on innovation have adopted the concepts of incremental and radical innovations (e.g. Ettlie et al. 
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1984; Dewar and Dutton 1986; Malhotra et al. 2001) or exploitative and exploratory innovations (e.g. 
Jansen et al. 2006). In the IS literature, Weeks and Feeny (2008) offer a helpful taxonomy of innovation 
that could be achieved through outsourcing. They distinguish between IT operational innovation, business 
process innovation and strategic innovation. Indeed, the vast majority of firms seeking innovation through 
outsourcing engagements have reported achieving IT operational and business process innovations 
(Weeks and Feeny 2008; Lacity and Willcocks 2013; Whitely and Willcocks 2011). Such innovations are 
achieved when the supplier introduces technology changes not impacting firm-specific business processes 
(IT operational) or changes the way the business operates in some important way (business process) 
(Weeks and Feeny 2008: 131). However, these studies report that client firms struggle to achieve strategic 
innovation through outsourcing engagements. Lacity et al. (2010) confirm the emphasis on IT operational 
and business process innovations through outsourcing engagements by highlighting that the main drivers 
to outsource include improvements in processes and services (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani 1998), 
achieving change (Linder 2004) and improvements of the delivery time (Khan and Fitzgerald 2004). Yet, 
recent studies suggest that, while such improvements are desired in outsourcing engagements, client firms 
seek ways to benefit from transformative innovations that improve business performance with existing 
clients or enable the firm to enter new markets (Weeks and Feeny 2008; Whitley and Willcocks 2011; 
Lacity and Willcocks 2014). Lacity et al. (2010: 406) conclude that “truly strategic reasons for 
outsourcing IT have been relatively under-studied”. Consequently, strategic innovation is one of the key 
challenges firms face in general (McDermott and O’Connor 2002) and in the context of outsourcing in 
particular (Weeks and Feeny 2008), and therefore will be the focus of this study.  
Examples of strategic supplier-led innovations include (i) the social media marketing platform that 
Infosys developed and implemented for Diageo1, and (ii) the supply chain system that IBM developed 
                                                             
1 Infosys developed and implemented a marketing platform for Diageo (a global premium drinks company) that enabled Diageo 
to centrally manage brands through multiple social media channels, such as Facebook, Twitter and others (radical innovation in 
Diageo’s marketing and brand management approaches, their core growth strategy). See press release: 
http://www.infosys.com/industries/consumer-packaged-goods/case-studies/Pages/new-digital-consumer-connections.aspx . 
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(with Vodafone) for Novartis in order to deliver anti-malaria medication to remote locations2. Such 
strategic innovations are not necessarily captured in the outsourcing contract, though they tend to emerge 
over time through the development of high-quality relationships between the client and the supplier in an 
ongoing outsourcing arrangement, such in the case of IBM and Novartis, as well as through various 
contractual arrangements that incentivize the supplier to innovate for the client (Lacity and Willcocks 
2014). As IS research weighs the contribution of either contractual or relational governance to 
outsourcing performance, several studies revealed that contractual governance in fact interacts with 
relational governance. For example, Goo and Huang (2008) found out that well-structured Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs) have a positive influence on the various aspects of relational governance in IT 
outsourcing engagements. Further, numerous studies supported opposing views debating whether 
relational governance and contractual governance act as complements or substitutes (e.g. Poppo and 
Zenger 2002; Carson et al. 2006; Goo et al. 2009; Tiwana 2010). Inspired by this debate, a recent study 
by Huber et al. (2013) has demonstrated how relational and contractual governance act as complementary 
as well as substitution at different points during an outsourcing engagement. 
The Role of Relational and Contractual Governance in Achieving Strategic Innovation   
There is a general perception in the literature that high-quality client-supplier relationships improve 
outsourcing outcomes (Kishore et al. 2003; Whitley and Willcocks 2011). In this regard, client-supplier 
relationships represent the connections between staff from the supplier and client side that result in 
information and knowledge exchanges (Lee and Kim 1999; Kishore et al. 2003; Lacity et al. 2010). 
Jansen et al. (2006: 1663) explain that such relationships between people comprise a more voluntary 
mode of coordination than hierarchical structure. Client-supplier relationships are often manifested 
through the examination of the effectiveness of knowledge transfer (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), the impact 
of cultural distance (e.g. Lee 2001; Rottman and Lacity 2006) and the degree of trust (e.g. Dibbern et al. 
                                                             
2 See press release: http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/29022.wss and 
http://www.malaria.novartis.com/innovation/sms-for-life/ 
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2008). In the specific context of strategic innovation through outsourcing, studies providing case-based 
evidence suggested a positive link between high-quality client-supplier relationships and the likelihood of 
achieving strategic innovation. For example, Weeks and Feeny (2008) argue that the relationship between 
the client and supplier will become instrumental in building the supplier’s business process design (the 
learning capability of the supplier) and client-industry knowledge (the supplier’s pool of business 
solutions), both imperative capabilities for the supplier in its attempt to deliver strategic innovations for 
the client  (Kern et al. 2002; Kishore et al. 2003; Koh et al. 2004; Moon et al. 2010). In this regard, we 
anticipate that high-quality relationships will assist the supplier in gaining knowledge about the client’s 
business and improve the supplier’s ability to offer the client strategic innovation. Thus, we hypothesize 
the following:                   
H1: There is a positive relationship between the quality of client-supplier relationships and the likelihood 
of achieving strategic innovation. 
While high quality client-supplier relationships is likely to result in strategic innovation, the contract type 
applied in the outsourcing engagement may have an effect on the quality of the client-supplier 
relationships. Indeed, various studies suggested that contractual and relational governance act as either 
complementary or substitute to each other (Tiwana 2010) hinting at the effect, either positive or negative, 
of contractual elements on the quality of the client-supplier relationships (Goo et al. 2009). We therefore 
seek to theorize how the use of fixed-price, time and materials, joint venture with profit sharing contracts 
and their combinations would influence the positive effect of the quality of the client-supplier 
relationships on the likelihood to achieve strategic innovation. 
A fixed-price contract may weaken the positive effect of the quality of client-supplier relationships on the 
likelihood to achieve strategic innovation. Consider the following example: A supplier is requested to 
develop a new supply chain system for their client to improve the delivery of anti-malaria medication in 
rural areas in Africa. While the supplier is likely to deploy its best resources and people to minimize the 
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risk involved in a fixed-price contract (Gopal and Koka 2012), it will still be rather challenging for the 
supplier to account for all expected costs of the development effort upfront as well as compute and 
include unforeseen technical and managerial challenges involved in developing and implementing this 
strategic innovation. Such a fixed-price outsourcing contract that has scope for (or requirement of) 
delivering innovation is very likely to be incomplete, requiring the parties to adjust it whenever 
expectations or supplier’s profitability have not been met (e.g. if a supplier is likely to endure significant 
additional efforts to deliver strategic innovations). A supplier may mitigate this risk of endangering its 
profitability if the parties agree to mutually adjust their obligations, expectations and interpretation of the 
fixed-price contractual term in what Gopal and Koka (2012) coined “relational flexibility”. However, 
unlike in IT operational or business process innovations (Weeks and Feeny 2008) where there is limited 
uncertainty about the costs involved in implementing new technology or a new change programme, thus a 
limited number of adjustments in the fixed-price contract, in a strategic innovation project the client and 
supplier will face a high degree of uncertainty (Dey et al. 2010; Dewar and Dutton 1986; McDermott and 
O’Connor 2002) requiring them to frequently adjust the contract. The likely result is a risk imbalance 
between the parties in favour of the client firm and a potential opportunism by the client. Consequently, 
opportunistic behaviour on the client’s side in such a situation is likely to erode the positive relational 
effect on the ability to achieve strategic innovation.  
Let us consider the same strategic innovation, i.e. the development of a new supply chain system from the 
earlier example, but this time examining the possible effect of a time and materials contract. Under a time 
and materials contract, the supplier’s risks are minimized as any personnel and materials costs incurred by 
the supplier will be charged to the client (Gopal and Koka 2010). However, as the development of the 
supply chain system under a time and materials contract does not pose a significant financial risk for the 
supplier, it is likely that the supplier will place their best resources and people on other projects where 
higher financial risk fixed-price contracts are used (Gopal and Koka 2012). Even if a client attempts to 
specify the skills of the supplier’s personnel required to work on delivering the strategic innovation 
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initiative, such skills will be difficult to verify, and project staffing can always be manipulated by the 
supplier as the project progresses (Gopal and Koka 2012), for instance by moving highly qualified staff to 
higher risk projects. Consequently, we posit that there is a risk of exercising opportunism by the supplier 
that is likely to negatively affect outcomes of the strategic innovation project by staffing the project with 
less qualified personnel (Krishnan et al. 2000), hence negatively affecting the quality of the relationship 
between the parties. On the other hand, it is possible that a supplier engaged in the development of a 
supply chain system under a time and materials contract will seek opportunities to extend the initial scope 
of the project by accepting the client’s requests for additional functionality (Bajari and Tadelis 2001), thus 
improving its project revenues (Gopal and Koka 2012). The materialization of such opportunity to extend 
the scope of the strategic innovation project will be subject to the client’s satisfaction with the already 
delivered components in terms of time, cost and quality (Gopal and Koka 2012). Therefore, the supplier is 
likely to restrain the degree of opportunism exercised over the client, by staffing with qualified personnel 
and being responsive to changes in the scope of the project, in order to increase the likelihood of greater 
revenues from the strategic innovation project, thus ensuring positive relationships between the parties. 
Time and materials contract will therefore influence, either in a positive or negative manner, the effect of 
the quality of client-supplier relationships on the likelihood to achieve strategic innovation. 
The few IS studies on innovation in service outsourcing hint at the possibility that a joint venture 
contract 3  may strengthen the positive effect of the quality of client-supplier relationships on the 
likelihood to achieve innovation (Lacity and Willcocks, 2014). Such observations have also been made in 
the manufacturing context in which it was claimed that “proximity to potential partners such as suppliers 
[…] significantly and positively influences innovation” (Becheikh et al, 2006: 658) by improving the 
transfer of tacit knowledge sharing, developing trust and social capital with partners and reducing 
                                                             
3 Joint venture contract is a partnership type of contract that defines how client and supplier firms contribute resources to the new 
venture and states how gains (i.e., profits or savings) will be shared. The partners outline the mission and objectives for the joint 
venture, including the provision of funding, initial physical assets, intellectual capital, staff members, and management 
capabilities. We use terms partnership and joint venture (with gainsharing) interchangeably throughout the paper referring to the 
same type of contract. 
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communication costs. Providing a rationale for the joint venture contract in IT outsourcing, DiRomualdo 
and Gurbaxani (1998: 76) claimed that “sharing the costs and risks of commercialization with outsourcing 
partners can help maximize return on IT investments”. It flows from the above that joint venture contracts 
are likely to enhance the relational effect by deflating the risk of opportunism between the parties; placing 
the partners on similar grounds in terms of the risks that they take in contributing resources to the venture; 
and incentivizing the parties to collaborate as a motivator to benefit from the venture gains.  
Client firms may also combine two or more contract types in order to benefit from the advantages of one 
contract type while safeguarding against risk of opportunism with the use of another contract. The most 
common example in the literature for the use of such a contract portfolio approach is the combination of 
joint venture settings along side either a fixed-price or a time and materials contract (Overby 2012). The 
gainsharing model, a type of a joint venture setting (Halvey and Melby 2005), is reported to be used when 
client firms seek dramatic business improvements from their suppliers (Overby 2012). The gainsharing 
model allows the client firm to pay the supplier for value delivered beyond the typical responsibilities that 
are captured in the outsourcing contract. Consider a scenario in which the client firm has contracted a 
supplier to develop software applications under either fixed-price or time and materials contract; however, 
the client is now seeking to achieve strategic innovation from the supplier. As neither fixed-price or time 
and material contracts are designed to motivate the supplier to innovate and they tend to pose a risk of 
opportunism by either the supplier or the client, the gainsharing model alongside these contracts is likely 
to encourage collaboration and a joint problem-solving attitude by the parties (Overby 2012). Lacity and 
Willcocks (2014: 78) conclude that: “among all the ways to incent innovation, gainsharing packs the most 
punch because it promises to increase the provider’s revenue as well as the client’s performance”. In other 
words, a gainsharing model alongside either a fixed-price or time and materials contract deflates the risk 
of opportunism on behalf of either the suppler or the client and motivates the parties to seek opportunities 
to maximize returns through collaboration and joint objectives (Overby 2012). We can therefore conclude 
that the combination of a joint venture contract (or joint venture economic models such as gainsharing) 
   
  11 
alongside either a fixed-price, time and materials or both contracts are likely to enhance the positive effect 
of the quality of client-supplier relationship on the likelihood to achieve strategic innovation.  
There is also a combination of fixed-price and time and materials contracts in a client contract portfolio. 
For example, an outsourcing arrangement in which the client firm is making regular payments to the 
supplier for the time and the materials spent on the project while rewarding the supplier upon delivery. 
Such a client contract portfolio is suitable for scenarios in which there is high uncertainty about the costs 
involved in developing a solution; however, there is clarity about the nature of the desired solution. As 
theorized above, re-adjusting the fixed-price contract when an uncertain outcome is sought as in the case 
of strategic innovation may elevate the risk of an opportunistic behavior on behalf of the client firm and 
therefore may erode the positive relational effect on the likelihood to achieve strategic innovation. On the 
other hand, time and material contract elements in this client contract portfolio are likely to restrain 
supplier opportunism as the supplier may identify an opportunity to increase revenues from the 
outsourcing engagement, thus seeking to tighten the relationship with the client and strengthening the 
positive effect of the quality of client-supplier relationship on the likelihood to achieve strategic 
innovation. However, as also argued above, time and materials contract elements also safeguard the 
supplier’s margins and therefore might motivate the supplier to exercise an opportunistic behavior by 
moving high-quality employees to higher risk projects (e.g. fixed-price projects), thus endangering the 
success of a strategic innovation initiative and tarnishing the relationship with the client firm. The 
combination of fixed-price and time and material contracts, therefore, may have either a positive or a 
negative effect on the impact of the quality of the client-supplier relationship on the likelihood to achieve 
strategic innovation.  
Having theorized about the effect of three contract types and their combinations, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
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H2: Client Contract Portfolio (applied as a stand-alone contact or as a combination of contracts) will 
influence the positive effect of the quality of client-suppler relationships on the likelihood to achieve 
strategic innovation. 
Our theoretical model that depicts hypotheses H1 to H2 is outlined in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Theoretical model 
 
 
METHODS 
Data Collection 
We conducted a cross-industry survey of major European client firms from financial services, 
manufacturing, logistics, retail, utilities, telecom and other sectors. The data collection took place in late 
2010. Senior managers at the client firms with extensive experience in outsourcing engagements for their 
firms were asked to respond to a survey regarding the quality of the relationships between their firm (unit 
of analysis) and their IT and business process outsourcing suppliers. This study applied a “key informant” 
methodology for data collection (Kumar et al. 1993; Segars and Grover 1998; Goo et al. 2008). To ensure 
that respondents were involved in major decisions regarding outsourcing in their organizations, and in the 
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governance of outsourcing arrangements, a set of screening questions were included as part of the survey. 
Some of the dimensions examined in the screening questions were the role of the respondent within the 
firm, his or her involvement in outsourcing decision-making (unit, national, global and/or executive 
levels), and different types of contracts he or she managed.  Over 2000 firms were initially contacted, and 
248 fully completed the survey instrument, resulting in a response rate over 10%. Based on the data, there 
was not a significant difference between the demographic characteristics of firms that responded and 
those that did not.   
To minimize potential biases, the respondents were assured that their responses and identities would 
remain confidential and that only aggregate information would be published. A “don’t know” response 
category was added to each question to minimize the risk of obtaining inaccurate responses from 
participants who did not know the answers to certain questions.  
Overall the respondents represented a diversity of firms across multiple industries, regions, revenues and 
functions outsourced.  In addition, those individuals who completed the survey for their firm tended to 
represent a high level of decision-making in the firm, over 74% represented their function at the global 
level.  For a full description of the firms, please see Table 1. 
Table 1:  Description of the sample 
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* These items were not mutually exclusive; hence the total is greater than 100%. 
Frequency Percentage
Benelux 25 10.08%
France 24 9.68%
Germany 25 10.08%
Nordics 24 9.68%
Switzerland 25 10.08%
United Kingdom 125 50.40%
$500 million - $1000 million 120 48.39%
$1000 million - $5000 million 65 26.21%
More than $5000 million 63 25.40%
Banking 46 18.55%
Insurance 36 14.52%
Internet media 39 15.73%
Manufacturing 47 18.95%
Retail 42 16.94%
Telecommunications 38 15.32%
Business Processes 185 74.60%
IT Development 198 79.84%
IT Maintenance 215 86.69%
Fixed-Price, Time and Materials & Joint Venture 20 8.06%
Fixed-Price & Time and Materials 73 29.43%
Fixed-Price & Joint Venture 31 12.50%
Time and Materials & Joint Venture 0 0.00%
Fixed-Price 106 42.74%
Time and Materials 14 5.64%
Joint Venture 4 1.61%
Frequency Percentage
I represent the function at the executive level 101 40.73%
I have global responsibility for the function 184 74.19%
I have national responsibility for the function 96 38.71%
I am responsible for the function of a business unit 
within the organization
83 33.47%
Decision-Making 
Authority of 
Respondent*
Firm Sector
Firm  Revenue
Country 
Description of the Firms
Client Contract Portfolio
Description of the Respondent
What Does the Firm 
Outsource*
Client Contract 
Portfolio
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Measurement  
This study used previously validated scales from the literature, but since the scales were oriented towards 
intra-organizational processes, they were adapted to fit outsourcing arrangements.  Appendix 1 provides 
the actual wording of the questions used in the survey.   
Dependent Variable 
Strategic Innovation Through Outsourcing4:  We measured strategic innovation using the scale developed 
by Jansen et al. (2006) (α=.848) (See Appendix 1 for the exact items). Answers to each item were 
anchored at 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree.  This scale is designed to measure the extent to 
which organizations pursued strategic (radical) innovations.  We adapted this measure to incorporate 
strategic innovation with outsourcing partners rather than solely internal processes. 
Independent Variable 
The Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships (α=.823) was measured using a threefive-item scale adapted 
from Jaworski and Kohli (1993) (See Appendix 1 for the exact items asked) in order to assess the 
respondents’ perceived quality of the relationships between the firm and its suppliers.  Each item was 
anchored between 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.  The scale was developed to measure the 
extent to which employees were networked to various other levels of the hierarchy. This scale was used in 
other studies (e.g. Jansen et al. 2006). We have adapted the measure to include cross-boundary 
connections between the client and supplier firms. 
                                                             
4 Since there is very limited literature on strategic innovation in the context of IT and business process outsourcing, there were no 
previous studies that used an operational measure of strategic innovation through outsourcing in IS literature. Comparing how 
Weeks and Feeny (2008) define strategic innovation (included earlier in the paper) with the established definitions from the 
innovation literature where radical/exploratory innovations are considered to result in new products and/or service lines (Droege 
et al. 2009), entering new markets (Berry et al. 2006) or introducing new distribution channels (Jansen et al. 2006), we have 
concluded that “strategic innovation” in the IS outsourcing context is in line with what is viewed as radical or exploratory 
innovations. Therefore the existing measure of exploratory innovation was adopted.  
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The threefive items measuring the perceived quality of the client-supplier relationships, as well as the six 
items measuring strategic innovation, were put through factor analyses using Promax rotation and Kaiser 
normalization in order to evaluate the internal and discriminant validity of the variables.  The results 
displayed in Table 2 show two distinct factors.  One factor represents strategic innovation, and the other 
represents the perceived quality of the client-supplier relationships.  Each of the obtained variables 
reflects the average of the mean item values.   
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Table 2:  Factor analysis of components in analysis 
   
Items 
Cronbach’s 
Alphas Pattern Matrix 
% of total 
variance 
explained 
We have invented new products and/or services working with 3rd parties. 
0.848 
0.681   
40.56 
We experiment with new products and services in our existing market 
through work with 3rd parties. 
0.731   
Our organization accepts demands from clients that go beyond existing 
products and services. 
0.715   
We commercialize products and services that are completely new to our 
organization through work with 3rd parties. 
0.754   
We frequently utilize new opportunities in new markets through work with 
3rd parties. 
0.850   
Our organization is exploring opportunities to use new distribution channels 
to deliver products and services through work with 3rd parties. 
0.675   
In our organization, there is ample opportunity for informal conversation 
among our staff and 3rd party employees that are based on our premises. 
0.8230.775 
  0.806714 
18.4515.4
9 
In our organization, our employees and 3rd party staff feel comfortable 
approaching each other when the need arises. 
  0.875756 
People involved in the outsourcing relationship are quite accessible to each 
other (regardless of whether they represent client or supplier side). 
  0.81015 
Notes: N=248;   ** Reversed item. 
          All items were measured on a five-point scale, anchored by 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. 
          Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
          Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization 
          Rotation converged in 11 iterations 
          Scores under .37 are not displayed 
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Moderating Variables 
Type of contract:  In order to test how different contractual arrangements influence the likelihood of 
achieving strategic innovation, we included three major types of contracts discussed in the literature that 
client organizations used with their outsourcing suppliers. Respondents were asked to indicate of the 
following contracts which type they have used in their outsourcing engagements: fixed-price (this 
included fixed fee for specified service and ticket-based contracts), time and materials or joint venture  
(see Appendix 1 for the exact item).  Our moderating variable included all combinations of contract types 
used by the firms, which resulted in six categories of contracts:  8.06% used a combination of fixed-price, 
time and materials and joint ventures; 29.43% used a combination of fixed-price and time and materials; 
12.50% use a combination of fixed-price and joint ventures; 42.74% use just fixed-price; 5.64% use just 
time and materials and 1.61% use just joint ventures5. 
Control Variables 
In the empirical study, we controlled for possible confounding effects by including various relevant 
control variables6. Three types of outsourcing arrangements were considered:  business processes, IT 
development and IT application maintenance. 7  Of the types of outsourcing used, 74.60% of the 
respondents indicated they outsourced business processes, 79.84% outsourced IT development and 
                                                             
5 There were no events reported for the combination of time and material and joint venture in our sample, as reported in Table 1. 
6 We attempted additional controls including industry, country and size of the company, but none of them had a significant effect 
on the outcomes; in order to avoid over-saturating the regression model we do not include them in further analysis. 
7 In line with IS outsourcing literature, we have distinguished between IT and business process outsourcing (Lacity et al. 2011, 
Lacity et al. 2009; Mani et al. 2010). IT outsourcing (ITO) is defined as the sourcing of information technology services through 
an external third party (Lacity et al. 2011).  Business process outsourcing (BPO) refers to the delegation of one or more 
information technology enabled business processes to an external service provider (Mani et al. 2010: 39). While ITO and BPO 
share many common attributes, such as the reliance on information technology solutions, there are some important differences 
between these two forms that have implications for the present study. From a client perspective, the main drivers of ITO are the 
ability to focus on core competencies of the firm and achieve reduction in costs. BPO, on the other hand, offers numerous 
objectives ranging from cost reductions to innovation and business transformation (Mani et al. 2010). It flows from this that 
client firms expect innovation to be delivered in the case of BPO. At the same time, ITO consists of at least two different 
components: IT development and application maintenance (e.g. Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2008; Gopal et al. 2003). IT 
development implies opportunities to innovate while application maintenance is traditionally perceived as less likely to lead to 
innovation.  
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86.69% indicated that they outsourced IT application maintenance. Table 3 includes the means, standard 
deviations and correlations of all variables. 
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Table 3:  Means, standard deviations and correlations  
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Strategic Innovation 3.27 0.86 - 
         
2. Business Processes 0.74 0.44 -0.07 - 
        
3. IT Development 0.80 0.40 -0.16** -0.29** - 
       
4. IT Application Maintenance 0.87 0.33 0.05 0.10 -0.19** - 
      
5. Quality of Client-Supplier 
Relationships 
3.5438 
0.84
2 
0.4452*
* 
-
0.040.0
2 
0.313** 
-
0.021 
- 
     
6. Fixed-Price, Time and Materials 
& Joint Venture 
0.08 0.27 0.06 0.07 0.03 -0.08 0.014 - 
    
7. Fixed-Price & Time and Materials 0.29 0.45 0.06 0.01 0.08 -0.09 0.013 -0.18** -    
8. Fixed-Price & Joint Venture 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.08 -0.04 0.10 0.063 -0.11 -0.24** -   
9. Fixed-Price 0.43 0.21 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.012 -0.06 -0.14* -0.08 -  
10. Time and Materials 
0.06 0.50 -0.08 -0.06 -0.12 0.04 
-
0.098 
-0.25** -0.55** -0.32** -0.19** - 
11. Joint Venture  0.02 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.09 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 
Note:  n= 248.  *p< .05, ** p<.01 
            
The value for the means for dichotomous variables represents the percentage of the sample in that category (variables 6-11 are dichotomous, 1 
meaning a firm uses that type(s) of contract(s), and 0 meaning the firm does not use that type(s) of contract(s),  
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Common Methods Variance 
In order to test for common methods variance (CMV) we conducted Harman’s single-factor test 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003).  Our results did not indicate common methods bias was high as more than one 
factor emerged to explain the variance in our analysis.  In addition, no one factor accounted for the 
majority of covariance among the measures, meeting both of the criteria set forth by Podsakoff et al. 
(2003) for determining if a detrimental level of common method bias exists.  We also conducted a second 
test to examine a control for the effects of an unmeasured latent method factor.  In this test, only three of 
the paths from CMV to single-indicator constructs were significant, indicating a small amount of CMV. 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
After assessing measurement properties and CMV, we tested our hypotheses regarding the effects of the 
quality of the client-supplier relationships on strategic innovation by estimating a series of hierarchical 
ordinary least squares linear regressions. Table 4 presents the results from these regressions. Model 1 
includes just the control variables. Model 2 adds the effect of the quality of the client-supplier 
relationships.  Model 3 adds the direct effects for the moderating variables.  Finally Model 4 adds the 
interaction effects between the quality of the client-supplier relationships and the type of contract used in 
the relationships.  To estimate these effects we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes 2013) and 
tested the effects for statistical significance using 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1000 
samples to reduce bias (Hayes 2013).  
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Table 4.  Hierarchical OLS linear regression predicting strategic innovation  
 
B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error
Outsource Business Processes -0.02 0.12 -0.09 0.11 -0.09 0.11 -0.14 0.11
Outsource IT Development 0.35 * 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.12
Outsource IT Maintenance 0.23 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.26 0.14
Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships 0.41 ** 0.06 0.41 ** 0.06
Fixed-Price, Time and Materials & Joint Venture 0.09 * 0.03
Fixed-Price & Time and Materials 0.01 0.26
Fixed-Price & Joint Venture -0.12 0.28
Fixed-Price -0.22 0.32
Time and Materials -0.09 0.26
Joint Venture 0.12 0.47
Fixed-Price, Time and Materials & Joint Venture X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships 0.30 * 0.15
Fixed-Price & Time and Materials X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships -0.27 0.45
Fixed-Price & Joint Venture X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships 0.24 * 0.06
Fixed-Price X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships -0.19 0.21
Time and Materials X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships -0.23 0.45
Joint Venture X Quality of the Client-Supplier Relationships 0.25 * 0.12
Intercept 2.89 0.22 1.82 0.25 1.86 0.35 2.25 0.28
R2
ΔR2
Note:  n= 248.  *p< .05, ** p<.01
0.15 0.09 0.06
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
0.04 0.19 0.28 0.34
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B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error
Outsource Business Processes -0.02 0.12 -0.14 0.10 -0.14 0.11 -0.16 0.11
Outsource IT Development 0.35 * 0.13 -0.04 0.12 -0.05 0.12 -0.05 0.12
Outsource IT Maintenance 0.23 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.14
Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships 0.50 ** 0.06 0.51 ** 0.06
Fixed-Price, Time and Materials & Joint Venture 0.06 * 0.03
Fixed-Price & Time and Materials -0.03 0.26
Fixed-Price & Joint Venture -0.12 0.28
Fixed-Price -0.27 0.32
Time and Materials -0.12 0.26
Joint Venture 0.19 0.47
Fixed-Price, Time and Materials & Joint Venture X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships 0.32 * 0.15
Fixed-Price & Time and Materials X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships -0.62 0.45
Fixed-Price & Joint Venture X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships 0.68 * 0.27
Fixed-Price X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships -0.89 0.52
Time and Materials X Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships -0.63 0.45
Joint Venture X Quality of the Client-Supplier Relationships 0.38 * 0.12
Intercept 2.89 0.22 1.67 0.24 2.89 0.22 1.87 0.28
R2
ΔR2
Note:  n= 248.  *p< .05, ** p<.01
0.25 0.02 0.02
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
0.04 0.28 0.30 0.32
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In Model 1, we saw the effects of the control variables.  There was not a significant effect for outsourcing 
business processes on strategic innovation.  There was a positive and significant effect for outsourcing IT 
development on strategic innovation (B = 0.35, p < 0.05).  Those firms that indicated they outsourced IT 
development reported higher levels of strategic innovation with their outsourcing partners. There was not 
a significant effect for outsourcing IT application maintenance on strategic innovation.   
In Model 2 we added the effect of the quality of the client-supplier relationships to Model 1. There was a 
positive and significant effect of the quality of the client-supplier relationships on strategic innovation (B 
= 0.4150, p < 0.01), supporting hypothesis 1.  This suggested that higher quality relationships between the 
client firm and its suppliers is likely to deliver strategic innovation. 
In Model 4 we tested the proposed moderation effects in hypothesis 2, which argue that the types of 
contract used will moderate the effect of the quality of client-supplier relationships on strategic innovation 
(summarized in Table 5).  In order to test the moderation effects, we estimated a ‘main effect’ model 
(Model 3) with a moderating effect model (Model 4) (Carte and Russell 2003) and meeting nine 
conditions that no errors have been made. Our analysis concluded that no errors of commission were 
made.  The interaction terms were calculated by multiplying the moderator (type of contract) by the 
predictor variable (quality of client-supplier relationships).  The moderating effects model included these 
variables, but the main effect model did not.   The effect for the moderation of using a portfolio that 
comprises of all three contract types on the influence of the quality of the client-supplier relationships on 
strategic innovation was positive and significant (B = 0.302, p < 0.05).   The effect for the moderation of 
fixed-price and time and materials contracts on the influence of the quality of the client-supplier 
relationships on strategic innovation was not significant (B = -0.627, p = n.s.).  The effect for the 
moderation of a portfolio comprised of fixed-price and joint ventures contracts on the influence of the 
quality of the client-supplier relationships on strategic innovation was positive and significant (B = 
0.2468, p= 0.05). The effect for the moderation of fixed-price contracts on the influence of the quality of 
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the client-supplier relationships on strategic innovation was not significant (B = -0.189, p = n.s.). The 
effect for the moderation of time and materials contracts on the influence of the quality of the client-
supplier relationships on strategic innovation was not significant (B = -0.263, p = n.s.).  The effect for the 
moderation of joint ventures contracts on the influence of the quality of the client-supplier relationships 
on strategic innovation was positive and significant (B = 0.2538, p= 0.05). Overall, our results 
consistently show that the use of joint ventures contracts (either alone or in a portfolio approach) 
positively moderate the effect of the quality of client-supplier relationships on strategic innovation.  The 
R2 of the main effect model is .28, and the R2 for the moderation model is .342.  The increase in R2 due to 
the addition of the interactions of the combinations of outsourcing arrangements and the quality of the 
client-supplier relationships is statistically significant. In order to further test the robustness of our results, 
we calculated the effect size formula suggested by Cohen (1988):  F2 = [R2 (moderation model) – R2 
(main effect model)]/[1-R2 (main effect model)].  We obtained an effect size F2 of 0.084.  Then, we 
multiplied F2 by (n-k-1), where n equals sample size, and k equals the number of independent variables.  
This enabled us to conduct a pseudo F-test for the change in R2 with 1 and n-k degrees of freedom 
(Mathieson et al. 2001).   The result of the pseudo F-test was 19.910.27 (p<.05).  Based on the values 
provided by Cohen (1988), an effect size of 0.02 is small, 0.15 is moderate, and 0.35 is large; therefore, 
we can conclude that the effect is small, yet significant. To further illustrate the impact of the 
moderations, we also charted the predicted values of strategic innovation when the moderations are 
present (see Figure 2).  Here it is visually apparent that the use of joint venture contracts either alone or in 
combination with other contract types magnifies the effect of the quality of client-supplier relationships.  
A test of the differences in slopes indicates that there is a significance difference between the slopes of the 
interaction of the quality of client-supplier relationships and the contract type (F (5, 241) = 65.2331, 
p<.05). 
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Table 5: Summary of Results 
Hypothesis Support/Reject 
H1 Positive relationship between the quality of client-supplier 
relationships and the likelihood of achieving strategic innovation 
Supported 
H2 Interaction effect between the following Client Contract Portfolio and 
the Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships: 
 
 - Fixed-price, Time and Materials & Joint Venture Supported (+) 
 -Fixed-price & Time and Materials Rejected 
 - Fixed-price & Joint Venture Supported (+) 
 - Fixed-price Rejected 
 - Time and Materials Rejected 
 - Joint Venture Supported (+) 
Figure 2.  Predicted Values of Strategic Innovation  
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DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this study we sought to examine the effect of relational and contractual governance on the ability to 
achieve strategic supplier-led innovation through outsourcing. We were motivated by several IS 
outsourcing studies that discussed innovation as a possible outcome of an outsourcing engagement and 
suggested that a high-quality relational governance may improve opportunities to achieve strategic 
supplier-led innovation. While such studies supported their arguments by relying on empirical evidence in 
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the form of case studies of innovations that go beyond operational and business process improvements 
and address strategic challenges (Weeks and Feeny 2008; Whitley and Willcocks 2011; Lacity and 
Willcocks 2014), our study aimed to model and test the effect of relational and contractual governance on 
likelihood of achieving strategic innovation. 
The results of this study have confirmed that high-quality client-supplier relationships positively affect 
the ability to achieve strategic innovation through outsourcing engagements. In this regard, high-quality 
client-supplier relationship facilitates the supplier’s ability to learn about the client’s business (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman 1995; Kishore et al. 2003), thus assisting in developing solutions that go beyond IT 
operational or business process innovation to affect services delivered to existing clients or even 
developing new markets (Weeks and Feeny 2008), similar to the earlier example we provided above 
about IBM engaging in strategic innovation for Novartis. Further, high-quality client-supplier 
relationships provide advantages to the parties by mitigating risk for the risk-exposed party through the 
use of relational flexibility that promotes adjustments in the contract to meet expectations of all parties 
(Gopal and Koka 2012).  
Motivated by extant literature that discusses complementarity between relational and contractual 
governance in improving outsourcing performance (e.g. Huber et al. 2013), we modeled and tested the 
interactions between contractual and relational governance as affecting strategic supplier-led innovation. 
In particular, we have considered the effect of three contract types and their combinations on the quality 
of client-supplier relationships. Our results show that fixed-price and time and materials contracts or their 
combination as part of the client contract portfolio do not magnify or weaken the positive effect of the 
quality of the relationships on the ability to achieve strategic innovation through outsourcing. On the 
other hand, our results demonstrate that a client contract portfolio with a joint venture contract included 
(either with fixed-price or time and materials or both) magnifies the positive effect of  the quality of the 
client-supplier relationships on the ability to achieve strategic innovation. The moderation effect of a 
stand-alone joint venture contract on the positive effect of the quality of the relationships on the ability to 
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achieve strategic innovation is positive and significant; however, we refrain from discussing these results 
because of the small number of firms in the sample.    
At this juncture we posit the following question: why does a joint venture contract or a combination of a 
joint venture contract with either fixed-price or time and materials magnify the positive effect of the 
relationships on the possibility to achieve strategic innovation? Our line of theorization has persistently 
argued that a client contract portfolio may magnify the effect of the quality of the client-supplier 
relationships should the contract help deflate the risk of opportunism on behalf of either the client firm or 
the supplier. A joint venture contract (as standalone or alongside fixed-price or time and materials) 
presents the parties with a similar level of risk as both client firm and supplier contribute capital and 
people to the venture, thus weakening the materialization of opportunism for either side and stimulating 
the parties to work towards common business goals (Overby 2012). Such partnership schemes, as part of 
the client contract portfolio, also motivate the parties to collaborate as the potential return from the 
investment can be achieved only if the venture is successful (DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani 1998). Based 
on our results, we argue that when using the gainsharing model alongside either fixed-price or time and 
materials contracts, the client and supplier realize the potential of benefiting from the joint venture, rather 
than just safeguarding against an opportunistic behavior of the other party (Gopal and Koka 2012). This 
explanation is in line with the assertion that strategic and radical innovations are likely to be found in 
inter-organizational relationships and networks where firms seek access to resources and capabilities that 
cannot be found internally (Dewar and Dutton 1986; Henderson and Clark 1990), also known as 
complementary assets (Teece 1986). For example, inter-organizational networks can facilitate the 
development of the joint research capability required for strategic innovation, which is greater than the 
research capability that the client firm can develop on its own (Powell 1996; Hoecht and Trott 2006). A 
joint research capability may still lead to a continuous bargaining process between the client and supplier 
about the appropriation of the value created (Mol 2005); however, the presence of a contractual 
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mechanism in the form of a gainsharing scheme, as part of the client contract portfolio, is likely to 
increase transparency regarding commitment and profit sharing involved in such setting.    
There are results in this study that require further explanation, in particular concerning the unsupported 
assumptions regarding the effect of fixed-price and time and materials contracts on relational governance.  
Indeed, past studies suggested that in fixed-price contracts the supplier is exposed to the risk of not 
meeting its profitability targets if the task at hand is undefined, in particular as suppliers tend to deploy 
highly qualified personnel in fixed-price contracts (Gopal and Sivaramakrishnan 2008; Gopal and Koka 
2010). Mitigating this risk should have been through the use of relational flexibility in which the supplier 
would have proposed on-going adjustments in the contract; however, this would be at the risk of 
negatively affecting the quality of the relationship with the client (Gopal and Koka 2012). Time and 
materials contracts may have resulted in unsatisfactory quality as a result of the supplier staffing the 
project with less qualified personnel thus exercising opportunism over the client. At the same time, the 
supplier is likely to exploit the opportunity to increase revenue through the engagement in strategic 
innovation and therefore is likely to refrain from opportunistic behaviour. As our results did not support 
either of these behaviours we may consider the following alternative explanations.  In the first alternative 
explanation we argue that since our survey involved large firms engaging in large outsourcing contracts 
often over many years, it is possible that the parties have developed strong relational flexibility that 
allows them to cope with on-going adjustments to a fixed-price contract despite the higher uncertainty 
involved. In the second alternative explanation we posit that the supplier may perceive some of the risks 
as opportunities to further engage in product and service development projects for the client, which would 
translate into future business opportunities. As a result, the supplier will focus on other outcomes that go 
beyond improving the client’s business performance, responding to the client’s emerging issues. In such a 
case, the supplier is likely to demonstrate ‘good will’ in resolving unforeseen or unaccounted for 
activities.  
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Theoretical Implications 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates strategic innovation as a dependent variable of 
outsourcing. In this regard, our study extends past studies that examined the effect of relational and 
contractual governance on outsourcing performance in two ways. First, results of our study suggest that 
outsourcing outcomes (typically viewed as business and process performance improvements (Lacity et al. 
2011) could include strategic innovation, which open possibilities for future studies to model and measure 
strategic innovation as part of outsourcing performance. Second, our study reveals that client-supplier 
relationships play a major role in facilitating strategic innovation through outsourcing. While research has 
argued that relational and contractual governance may act as complements rather than substitutes 
(Kishore et al. 2003; Koh et al. 2004; Moon et al. 2010), our analysis suggests that such interactions 
between these two governance approaches are likely to happen in the case of strategic innovation under 
certain conditions such as when joint venture or other gainsharing schemes are part of the client contract 
portfolio and less likely to happen in the case of a stand-alone fixed-price and time and materials 
contracts (Gopal and Koka 2012).   
Practical Implications 
There are some practical implications that surface from this study. Our study supports past observations 
that client firms seeking strategic innovation through outsourcing should first and foremost invest in 
relational governance. Indeed, useful practices for innovation through outsourcing have been widely 
reported by Lacity and Willcocks (2014) which include leadership pairs from client and supplier, trust 
building steps and modes of operation that support collaboration and openness. Managers should also 
consider the type of contracting when seeking strategic innovation. While our analysis shows that fixed-
price contracts are widely used in outsourcing deals, there is now growing evidence that clients and 
suppliers use contracts with gainsharing schemes as a way to incentivize parties to engage in high-risk 
strategic innovation initiatives (Overby 2012; Halvey and Melby 2005). Last but not least, managers need 
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to consider strategic innovation through outsourcing at the outset of contracting, i.e. as part of the 
strategic intent of the outsourcing act (Whitley and Willcocks 2011). Indeed, a study by Leimeister et al. 
(2008) shows variation in behaviours between firms that seek and those that do not seek innovation from 
their IT outsourcing engagements, highlighting the importance of strategic intent as the first step in 
pursuing innovation through outsourcing.  
Limitations and Future Research   
Finally, the analysis presented in this paper is subject to several limitations. First, we have used three 
types of contracts which are not necessarily representing the complete range of contracts applied by firms 
in their outsourcing engagements. Future research should consider extending the range of contract types 
used in outsourcing engagements to include outcome-based contracts, and looking into different 
alternative arrangements that fit under the broad category of fixed-price contracts, such as large work 
package fixed-fee and a consumption-based contract. Second, our sample is biased towards the European 
perception of strategic innovation through outsourcing which can be affected by the relative immaturity 
level of the European outsourcing market as compared with the USA market. We see an opportunity to 
conduct a similar study in the context of the USA outsourcing industry to compare with the results of this 
study. Last but not least, DiRomualdo and Gurbaxani (1998) found that clients need to match the type of 
ITO decision (business improvement, IS improvement, or commercialization) with the appropriate 
contract type. Our study did not consider the strategic intent of the client firm as our intention was to test 
senior managers’ general perceptions regarding the link between outsourcing and strategic innovation. 
Future research can refine our results by including the strategic intent as a variable affecting the type of 
contract selected for outsourcing.  
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Appendix 1:  Measures and Items  
The following text was included in the beginning of the questionnaire: “In this research questionnaire we 
are going to ask you about the outsourcing of IT and business processes to third-party providers. By 
outsourcing we mean business process outsourcing and technology outsourcing as opposed to facilities 
and service management.” 
Strategic Innovation* 
Based on Jansen et al. (2006) 
We have invented new products and/or services working with 3rd parties. 
We experiment with new products and services in our existing market through work with 3rd parties. 
Our organization accepts demands from clients that go beyond existing products and services. 
We commercialize products and services that are completely new to our organization through work with 
3rd parties. 
 
We frequently utilize new opportunities in new markets through work with 3rd parties. 
Our organization is exploring opportunities to use new distribution channels to deliver products and 
services through work with 3rd parties. 
 
Quality of Client-Supplier Relationships 
Based on Jaworski and Kohli (1993) 
In our organization, there is ample opportunity for informal conversation among our staff and 3rd party 
employees that are based on our premises. 
In our organization, our employees and 3rd party staff feel comfortable approaching each other when the 
need arises. 
Managers discourage employees discussing work-related matters with those who are not immediate 
superiors.** 
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People involved in the outsourcing relationship are quite accessible to each other (regardless of whether 
they represent client or supplier side). 
In our outsourcing organization, it is easy to talk with virtually anyone you need to, regardless of rank, 
position or organization to which he/she belongs. 
 
Contract Type 
What type of contracts do you use with your vendors? (you can select more than one type of contract) 
Time and materials 
Fixed-price (e.g. fixed fee for specified service and/or ticket-based contract) 
Joint venture with profit sharing 
 
*All items were measured on a five-point scale, anchored by 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. 
** Reversed item. 
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